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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota law. The Review was writ-
ten by Rick Lanners and Elizabeth Rutten as a special project for the
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW.
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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
In re C.L.L.
In In re C.L.L.,' the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal from a predispositional order confirming a juvenile court referee's
post-adjudication recommendations and findings.2 The dismissal was
based on lack of jurisdiction.'
The referee had determined that the appellant had committed a
delinquent act.4 The referee concluded that the parties should be heard
on the need for rehabilitation and treatment of the appellant and, if nec-
essary, on the matter of appropriate disposition.5 The dispositional hear-
ing was postponed pending the district court's review of the referee's
findings.6 Following the district court's confirmation of the referee's find-
ings, the dispositional hearing was again postponed pending an appeal to
the supreme court.7
This was a case of first impression in North Dakota.' The court
stated that it was both "highly unusual" and "improper appellate proce-
dure" for an appeal to be taken prior to a dispositional hearing under
section 59 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act.gBecause this was a case of
first impression, the court looked to the laws of the two other states which
have also adopted the Uniform Juvenile Court Act.'0 The court relied on
a line of cases from Georgia on this issue.11
Based on the reasoning applied in Georgia's interpretation of section
59 of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from adjudication
orders entered prior to a disposition hearing because a dispositional hear-
ing is not a final appealable judgment.
12
The appeal was dismissed.'3
1. 507 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1993).





7. In re C.L.L., 507 N.W.2d 900.
8. LI
9. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 (1991) (adopting Unif. Juvenile court Act § 59, 9A U.L.A.
(1987) and considering the appealability of juvenile proceedings).
10. In re C.L.L., 507 N.W.2d 900 (noting that the Uniform Juvenile Court Act has also been
adopted by Georgia and Pennsylvania).
11. Id. at 901 (comparing M.K.H. v. State, 207 S.E.2d 645 (Ca. Ct. App. 1974) (finding a lack of
appellate jurisdiction because dispositional hearings are not final appealable judgments) with in re
S.C.S., 367 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. Ct. A pp. 1988) (finding sufficient jurisdiction following both the





ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENT REPRESENTATION
Disciplinary Action Against Nassif
In Disciplinary Action Against Nassif,14 DeLayne G. Nassif received
a public reprimand, paid the costs of the disciplinary proceeding, and was
ordered to achieve a passing score on the professional responsibility
examination for lack of competence in representing Philomere E.
Johnson.' 5
Johnson was injured in February, 1983, when she slipped and fell
outside a bakery in Fargo."8 In 1984, Johnson hired Nassif to represent
her in an action against the bakery.'7 Approximately five years later, Nas-
sif and Johnson met with an insurance adjuster to discuss a settlement of
the claim.' 8 Afterwards, Johnson contacted Nassif about her claim by tel-
ephone and with a Christmas card. 9 In June, 1990, approximately one
year later, Johnson approached another attorney to represent her.20 Nas-
sif insisted that he was entitled to his share of the claim and insisted on
handling Johnson's claim.2' In February, 1991, Nassif informed Johnson
"that she would receive a settlement from the insurance company, but she
never did."22 Johnson then filed a complaint with the disciplinary
board.'
In March, 1992, a three-person panel, designated by the disciplinary
board, heard the complaint.2 The panel determined that Nassif had vio-
lated the Code of Professional Responsibility, in effect before January 1,
1988, as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct, currently in effect.2
The disciplinary board accepted the panel's findings and presented a rec-
ommendation for a public reprimand to the North Dakota Supreme
Court.26 Nassif asserted to the court that he should receive a private rep-
rimand rather than a public reprimand. 7
The supreme court examined the North Dakota Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (NDSILS) which directs that a private repri-
mand is appropriate when there is "little or no" injury, and a public repri-
mand is appropriate when there is either an actual injury or the potential
14. 504 N.W.2d 311 (N.D. 1993).










25. Nassif, 504 N.W.2d at 312-13.
26. Id at 313.
27. Id.
1994]
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for injury.2 The court issued a public reprimand, stating that there was
an actual injury because the statute of limitations had run on Johnson's
potential claim. 29
The Court found additional support for a public reprimand in apply-
ing the NDSILS requirement that both aggravating and mitigating factors
should be considered when deciding appropriate sanctions.30 Aggravating
factors include: substantial experience in the practice of law, refusal to
acknowledge wrongful conduct, and prior disciplinary offenses. 3 ' All
three of these aggravating factors were present in Nassif's case, further
demonstrating that a public reprimand was appropriate.3 2
Accordingly, the supreme court ordered that Nassif receive a public
reprimand, achieve a passing score on the professional responsibility
examination, and pay the cost of the disciplinary proceeding against
him.33
AUTOMOBILES-EVIDENCE OF SOBRIETY TESTS
Erickson v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation
In Erickson v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transporta-
tion,3 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the State Toxicologist
does not have to certify that blood testing equipment is "in good working
order."as
Dwight Erickson was arrested for being in control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol.36 A small quantity of Erickson's blood was
sent to the State Toxicologist for testing.37 Erickson was informed that his
license would be suspended and in response he requested an administra-
tive hearing to challenge the suspension., At the hearing, Erickson
objected to a list of approved chemical testing devices brought by the
State Toxicologist.39 Erickson asserted that one of the items on the list,
the gas chromatograph, used for the blood alcohol analysis, had never
been inspected or found to be in good working order.40
28. See id. at 313-14.
29. Id. at 315.
30. Nassif, 504 N.W.2d at 314.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. Id. at 315.
34. 507 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1993).
35. Erickson v. Director, North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 507 N.W.2d 537, 537 (N.D. 1993).




40. Erickson, 507 N.W.2d at 538.
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The administrative hearing officer allowed the list of items into evi-
dence and suspended Erickson's license.4' Erickson appealed the deci-
sion to the district court.42 The district court reversed the decision of the
administrative hearing officer, concluding that the device should have
been inspected to determine whether it was in good working order.43
The court examined section 31-11-03(15) of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code which "gives the official acts of the State Toxicologist a disputa-
ble presumption of regularity . . .. 44 Erickson provided nothing to refute
this "disputable presumption."45 Erickson's only challenge was that the
machine was not inspected for accuracy.48 However, the court noted that
section 39-20-07(5) only requires approval by the State Toxicologist of
any device used to analyze blood.47 It does not require such devices to be
checked for accuracy.' Because the State Toxicologist had approved the
use of the gas chromatograph in the analysis of blood samples, the
supreme court allowed the results from the gas chromatograph into
evidence.49
The trial court was reversed.50
Bieber v. North Dakota Department of Transportation Director
In Bieber v. North Dakota Department of Transportation Director,51
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a vacutainer tube used to
collect a motorist's blood did not have to be certified by the State
Toxicologist.5 2
In January, 1993, James Leroy Bieber was stopped for speeding and
subsequently arrested for driving under the influence.- 3 Bieber was then
taken to a hospital where he agreed to give a blood sample.- 4 A registered





45. Erickson. 507 N.W.2d at 539.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 540.
49. Id. The supreme court also chose to rule on whether the Director of Transportation had
jurisdiction to suspend Erickson's license, an issue not reached by the district court. Id. Erickson
argued that because the Director had not received the results from the State Toxicologist within five
days, the Director lost jurisdiction. Id. Erickson applied section 39-20-03.2(3) of the North Dakota
Century Code dealing with nonresidents, even though Erickson was a resident. Id. The court
recognized that while the Director must receive the report before jurisdiction is established, receipt
of the report within five days is not required. Id. at 541.
50. Erickson, 507 N.W.2d at 541.
51. 509 N.W.2d 64 (N.D. 1993).
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State Toxicologist, to collect the blood sample.5 s The State Toxicologist
subsequently examined the blood and determined that Bieber's blood
alcohol concentration was .17 percent.' After Bieber was informed that
his license would be suspended, he requested an administrative hearing
to challenge the suspension.57
At the hearing, Bieber objected to the state's use of his blood test
results.5 Bieber asserted that the vacutainer tube was not a proper
device for the drawing of blood.59 The hearing officer admitted the
exhibit after noting the objection.60 Bieber's license was suspended, and
he appealed to the district court.6 ' The district court found the results of
the test inadmissible, and therefore reversed the decision of the adminis-
trative hearing officer.62 The director then appealed the district court's
decision.63
Bieber first alleged that the vacutainer tube was a "device" that had
not been approved by the State Toxicologist in accordance with section
39-20-07(5) of the North Dakota Century Code, which defines a "device"
as an instrument that performs chemical analysis.6 The court deter-
mined that the vacutainer tube does not perform chemical analysis, but
rather is a blood collection kit meant to safely collect and store blood.6
The court stated that the vacutainer tube is an auxiliary device, and auxil-
iary devices do not need to be approved by the State Toxicologist.
6 6
The court applied the holding in Schense v. Hjelle,67 that auxiliary
devices used in the testing process must be "fairly administered" as
required by section 39-20-07(5) of the North Dakota Century Code.68
The issue thus became whether the vacutainer tube was "fairly adminis-
tered" because the tube used to collect Bieber's blood was not individu-
ally certified and approved by the State Toxicologist.6 9 The State
Toxicologist is accorded a "disputable presumption of regularity" in its
official acts.7" The court determined that because Bieber had presented
55. 1l
56. Id.





62. Bieber, 509 N.W.2d at 66.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 67.
65. 1&
66. I&
67. 386 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1986).
68. Bieber. 509 N.W.2d at 67 (citing Schense v. Hjelle, 386 N.W. 2d 888 (N.D. 1986)).




no evidence of a defect in the vacutainer tube or of contamination of the
chemicals in the tube, the vacutainer was "fairly administered."'
Bieber next alleged that he was prejudiced by the administrative
hearing officer's failure to rule on objections.7' Section 28-32-06(1) of
the North Dakota Century Code requires objections to be noted on the
record.73 The court recognized that the better procedure would have
been to rule on the objections, but determined that Bieber was not
prejudiced by the failure to rule on each objection.7 4





In Severson v. Surita,' the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
it is within the discretion of the trial court to propose the imposition of
costs for allowing the defendant to amend his answer on the morning of
trial, and that it is within the trial court's authority to inform the defend-
ant of the consequences of granting his motion to amend.7 7
In his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant inadver-
tently admitted an allegation which he meant to deny.78 On the morning
of trial, the defendant "made an oral motion for leave to amend his
answer." 9 The defendant claimed that his mistake was made due to a
clerical error.80 The plaintiff argued that "the effect of granting the pro-
posed amendment would be to materially change the [defendant's]
answer" and would require the plaintiff to call an additional and presently
unavailable witness."'
The trial court, upon realizing that granting the amendment would
require a continuance to a later date, gave the defendant the option of
proceeding under his original answer or proceeding with his motion.8"
The court informed the defendant that if he proceeded with his motion
and it were granted, all costs of the current proceeding, including the
plaintiff's attorney fees for that day, would be assessed against him.8
71. Id.
72. rd
73. Bieber, 509 N.V.2d at 69.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 506 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1993).





82. Severson, 506 N.W.2d at 411.
83. Id.
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The defendant abandoned his motion and the trial court proceeded to
hear the case. 4
In affirming the decision of the trial court, The supreme court held
that Rule 15(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure "gives
courts the authority to impose conditions, including payment of attorney
fees,'when granting permission to amend."s The court also held that it
was within the trial court's authority to inform the moving party of the
consequences of the granting of his motion.86 The supreme court noted
that the trial court did not inform the defendant of the consequences to
coerce him into making a decision, but rather to enable him to make an
informed decision regarding whether to proceed with his motion. 7 The
court stated, "[w]hile we do not hold that trial courts have a duty to
explain the consequences of motions ... in this case the trial court was
acting within its discretionary powers in doing so.""
The decision of the trial court was affirmed.8 9
CONTRACTS-NEOTIATIONS BETWEEN SCHOOL BOARD AND
TEACHERS
Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School
Distuict
In Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School Dis-
trict,9 ' the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that a school board
may not unilaterally issue last-offer contracts which contain provisions
applicable to a future year not yet under discussion.9 1 Thus, a school
board's power to issue last-offer contracts to public school teachers is lim-
ited to contracts for the school year which is under negotiation.
2
In negotiating contracts for the 1991-92 school year, the parties
reached an impasse on several contract items.9 3 After the last offer made
by the school district was rejected, the district declared the negotiations
completed and directed the unilateral issuance of contracts to the teach-
ers for the 1991-92 year based on the school board's final offer.94 The
84. id
85. Id. at 412.
86. Id
87. Severmon, 506 N.W.2d at 412.
88. id
89. Id.
90. 499 N.W.2d 120 (N.D. 1993).
91. Dickinson Educ. Ass'n. v. Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist., 499 N.W.2d 120, 126 (N.D. 1993).
92. Id




final contracts included provisions which would not take effect until
1993.9-
The Dickinson Education Association (DEA) challenged the school
district's authority to unilaterally issue contracts on last offers which
include contractual provisions which do not apply to the school year
under negotiation, but apply only to future school years.96 The school
district contended that the position of the DEA ignored the "prospective
nature which is inherent in all contract negotiations." 97
The supreme court examined section 15-38.1-12 of the North
Dakota Century Code governing the contract negotiation process
between teachers and public school districts.9" This statute merely
requires good faith negotiation between the parties, but it does not com-
pel either party to make a concession, nor does it mandate that the parties
reach an agreement.9 The statute does not include provisions regarding
what is to be done in a dispute in which the parties fail to reach an
agreement.'0°
Quoting their decision in Edgeley Education Association v. Edgeley
Public School District,1° the court stated, "[tihe Legislature has failed to
provide a mechanism by which the parties might resolve their remaining
differences - thus, the School Board is permitted to issue contracts to
the school district's teachers on the basis of its last offer."102 The court
recognized that the school district's power to unilaterally issue last-offer
contracts creates a tremendous disparity in bargaining power.103 Thus, in
an effort not to further expand this disparity in power, the court held that
a school district's power to unilaterally issue last-offer contracts is limited
95. id. at 122-23.
96. Dickinson Educ. Ass'n., 499 N.W.2d at 124-25.
97. Id at 125.
98. Id. at 123. Section 15-38.1-12 of the North Dakota Century Code provides
1. The school board, or its representatives, and the representative organization, selected
by the appropriate negotiating unit, or its representatives, shall have the duty to meet at
reasonable times at the request of either party and to negotiate in good faith with respect
to:
a. Terms and conditions of employment and employer-employee relations.
b. The formulation of an agreement which may contain provision for binding arbitration.
c. Any question arising out of interpretation of an existent agreement.
4. The obligations imposed in this section shall not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or to make a concession.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1993)) (requiring good faith negotiations but neither
compelling party concessions nor mandating final agreements).
99. Dickinson Educ. Ass'n. 499 N.W.2d at 124.
100. Id.
101. 256 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1977).
102. Dickinson Educ. Ass'n., 499 N.W.2d at 124 (quoting Edgeley Educ. Ass'n. v. Edgeley Pub.
Sch. Dist., 256 N.W.2d 348, 354 (N.D. 1977)).
103. Id. at 126.
19941 697
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to contractual provisions concerning the school year which is the subject
of the negotiations.104
The decision of the district court was reversed and the case was
remanded. 0 5
CRIMINAL LAw-ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION
Sampson v. State
In Sampson v. State,10 Dennis C. Sampson applied for post-convic-
tion relief of his conviction for reckless endangerment, a class C felony,
alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.1 7 The
North Dakota Supreme Court held that Sampson was not prejudiced by
his attorney's failure to appeal his conviction.' 08
In 1985, Sampson was convicted of reckless endangerment, which
carried a maximum imprisonment of five years.0'° Section 12.1-32-
02.1(2) of the North Dakota Century Code required a minimum of two
years imprisonment without the possibility of parole to be included in the
reckless endangerment conviction because Sampson had threatened the
victim with "imminent bodily injury with a firearm."110 Sampson was
informed twice of the two-year minimum sentence; once when the verdict
was returned at the conclusion of the trial, and a second time at the sen-
tencing hearing."' The written judgment from the court did not include
the two-year minimum period, but the court, two months later, com-
pleted an "amended" judgment that corrected the clerical mistake in the
first written judgment."
2
Sampson, acting on his own behalf, appealed the judgment."
3
Sampson was then appointed a new attorney.1 4 The new attorney filed a
motion to dismiss Sampson's appeal."15
Sampson, acting on his own behalf, brought an appeal." 6 Sampson
alleged that he did not receive adequate assistance of counsel from his
appellate counsel."17 However, the court explained that a defendant must
allege "deficient representation by counsel and prejudice caused by the
104. 1&
105. Id.
106. 506 N.W.2d 722 (N.D. 1993).
107. Sampson v. State, 506 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (N.D. 1993).
108. Id. at 726.
109. Id. at 725.
110. Id.
111. Id





117. Sampson, 506 N.W.2d at 726.
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deficient representation" to establish a claim of inadequate assistance of
appellate counsel. 118 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not
suited for summary disposition without an evidentiary hearing. 119 The
court stated that Sampson was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of inadequate assistance of counsel because Sampson had not
raised an "issue of material fact that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
failure to pursue the appeal of his conviction."2 0
Next, Sampson argued that the "amended" judgment made the origi-
nal sentence "more onerous" because he was not present.' 2 ' Rule 36 of
the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies that clerical mis-
takes made in judgments "may be corrected by the court at any time
.... ,,122 The court held that the oral pronouncement of the sentence was
controlling and that the "amended" judgment was not more onerous than
the original pronouncement.'2
Finally, Sampson argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to cross-examine an adverse witness." Rule 609(a) of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence allows an individual to impeach a hostile wit-
ness with prior felony convictions.125 However, in this case, the witness
had only been arrested, not convicted. 128 Since the Constitution gives a
defendant the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, the court
held that the mere arrest was not enough to allow impeachment of a
witness.
12 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying post-
conviction relief.'
Frey v. State
In Frey v. State,'2 9 Jeffrey Eugene Frey applied for post-conviction
relief arguing that trial counsel impermissibly interfered with his right to
testify and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 13 The
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Frey received effective
118. Id (using the same standard necessary to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel with respect to trial counsel).
119. Id (citing State v. Wilson, 466 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1991)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Sampson, 506 N.W.2d at 727.
123. Id at 726-27.
124. Id at 728.
125. Id (citing N.D. R. EviD. 609 (a) (1994)).
126. Id.
127. Sampson, 506 N.W.2d at 727. Sampson also argued that he vas entitled to the jury
instruction of self-defense, but the court found no evidence to support the claim. See id
128. Id. at 729.
129. 509 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1993).
130. Frey v. State, 509 N.W.2d 261, 262 (N.D. 1993).
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assistance of counsel and denied the application for post-conviction
relief.1
31
At the commencement of the trial, Frey's counsel informed the jury
they would hear evidence that would support a self-defense ruling.132 At
that time, trial counsel had not yet determined whether he would advise
Frey to testify on his own behalf.13 After the state rested, the trial coun-
sel advised Frey to not testify, because of Frey's having made one or more
prior inconsistent statements, his appearance, his lying to officers about
not hunting on the day in question, and his involvement with illegal
drugs.' 34 On the basis of his trial counsel's advice, Frey did not testify.
135
On appeal, Frey asserted that his trial counsel intruded on his right
to testify, because counsel believed Frey would give perjurious testi-
mony.'3 6 However, the court noted that Rule 3.3(b) of the North Dakota
Rules of Professional Conduct specifies that, "[a] lawyer may refuse to
offer evidence that the lawyer believes is false."'3 7 A few weeks before
trial, Frey told his counsel "in so many words," that self-defense was not
what had happened.3 The court stated that "[a] lawyer's strategy to
avoid offering evidence that he believes will be false does not violate the
lawyer's ethical duty to his client."13 9 Because trial counsel believed Frey
would give perjurious testimony if called to testify, the court determined
that trial counsel did not violate his ethical duty to his client.'40
Frey next asserted that "trial counsel was ineffective" because during
his opening statement, he referred to evidence that would support a self-
defense ruling.' 4 ' The evidence that was to support a self-defense ruling,
however, was never brought before the jury.' 42 After the state rested,
trial counsel determined the possible rewards and hazards of presenting
testimony that would support a self-defense ruling and chose to advise
Frey not to testify.143 The court concluded that trial counsel was not inef-
fective by advising Frey not to testify in support of the self-defense
131. Id at 266.
132. Id at 264.
133. Id at 263.
134. Id at 263-64.
135. Frej, 509 N.W.2d at 263.
136. Id
137. 1d at 264. The comment to Rule 3.3 further specifies that:
If a lawyer knows evidence to be false, the lawyer must refuse to offer it regardless of a
client's wishes and regardless of whether it is to be offered by a client or some other
perso. If a lawyer believes such evidence to be false, the lawyer may refuse to offer the
evidence without violation of the lawyer's ethical duty to represent the client diligently.
Id €jting comments to N.D. R. PROF. CONDUar 3.3).
139. Id.
140. Frey, 509 N.W.2d at 264.
141. Id
142. Id. at 265.
143. Id
700 [Vol. 70:689
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instruction because tactics and strategies frequently are altered during a
trial due to the nature of litigation. 144
The court denied Frey's request for post-conviction relief.'4
CRIMINAL LAW-CORROBORATION
State v. Pacheco
In State v. Pacheco,' Lorna Pacheco appealed her conviction of
theft of property, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to give the
requested corroboration instruction.
14
A third person had passed out in Pacheco's apartment.14 8 Phyliss
Luger observed Pacheco and Patrick Peltier steal money from the per-
son's wallet.1 49 As soon as Pacheco and Peltier realized Luger was watch-
ing, they gave her five dollars and told her to keep quiet about what she
saw.'50 Luger later testified against Pacheco at the trial.1"'
Pacheco asserted on appeal that because Luger was an accomplice to
the crime, the jury should be instructed that Luger's testimony must be
corroborated with other evidence, as required by section 29-21-14 of the
North Dakota Century Code.152 Pacheco conceded that Luger's actions
did not make her an accomplice under the definition of "accomplice" in
section 12.1-03-01(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, but asserted
that the court should use a broader definition of "accomplice" in deter-
mining whether one's testimony must be corroborated under section 29-
21-14 of the North Dakota Century Code.' 3 The court chose not to
apply a broader definition, but to continue to require corroboration of
testimony only if the witness could be criminally responsible as an accom-
plice under section 29-21-14 of the North Dakota Century Code.
154
The court confirmed the trial court's conviction.'
144. Id
145. Frey, 509 N.W.2d at 266. The court also rejected Frey's arguments that he had not
intelligently waived his rights to a lesser offense, and that the murder statute violated the equal
protection clause. Id at 265-66.
146. 506 N.W.2d 408 (N.D. 1993).





152. Pacheco, 506 N.W.2d at 408.
153. Id at 409.
154. Id
155. Id. at 410.
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CRIMINAL LAW-MINOR IN POSSESSION
In re KS.
In In re K S.,1,96 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that, in order
to establish the offense of minor in possession, the state is required to
prove that a minor actually exercised dominion or control over an alco-
holic beverage.
157
The State appealed a juvenile court "order that set aside a referee's
finding that K.S., a 15-year-old girl, committed the unruly act of being a
minor in possession of alcohol."'5 8 The North Dakota Supreme Court
disagreed with the State and affirmed the juvenile court order.15 9
Shortly before 2:00 a.m. on August 25, 1992, a Grand Forks police
officer went to a house party in response to a "loud party" complaint. 16°
As someone came to answer the door, the officer could hear juveniles
running upstairs and hiding in the house. 161 Alcoholic beverages were
present in the house and "appeared accessible to anyone in the house." 6 '
K.S. had gone to the party knowing that alcohol was present.' 6 She
had been there about thirty minutes before the police arrived but had
neither consumed alcoholic beverages nor brought them to the party.' 64
"When [the] police arrived, K.S. ran upstairs and hid in a closet with a
[juvenile] who had been drinking."'
s
The judicial referee ruled that K.S. had committed the unruly
offense of minor in possession of an alcoholic beverage. 166 The referee
based his decision on the fact that, "said minor was located at a party in a
house . . . where alcoholic beverages were present."' 67
The juvenile court set aside the referee's decision that K.S. had com-
mitted the unruly act of minor in possession. 1' The juvenile court stated
that being a minor in a location where alcoholic beverages are present
does not constitute being a minor in possession of an alcoholic bever-
age. 169 Lacking evidentiary proof that K.S. was responsible for purchas-
ing, consuming or intending to consume alcohol, or exercising control
156. 500 N.W. 2d 603 (N.D. 1993).
157. In re KS., 500 N.W.2d 603, 608 (N.D. 1993).
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over an alcoholic beverage, the court stated that it could not find the
minor in violation of the statute.' 70
Appellate review of the juvenile court decision requires a trial de
novo; therefore, the court independently reviewed the evidence on
appeal.' 71 The state argued that K.S. was strictly liable for the offense
because she had admitted to having knowledge of the contraband and its
availability, and, therefore could not claim the affirmative defense of
"unwitting or unknowing possession." 72
Although the supreme court construed North Dakota Century Code
section 5-01-08 to be a strict liability offense, it refused to accept the
state's theory that a minor could be in constructive possession of alcohol
when he or she has failed to exercise dominion and control over the
substance. 73
The court construed the plain language of the statute, together with
its purpose, to determine that "a minor is culpable only for actual, not
constructive, possession of alcohol."' 74 The court stated that this inter-
pretation would avoid any implication that a minor may be liable for alco-
hol kept by parents or guardians in their home.7'
Quoting the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision In re 1LB.,' 76 the
court stated,
[TIhe opportunity to possess, standing alone, does not establish
possession. There must additionally be the exercise of some
dominion or control over the substance .... To be functional,
the opinion and control necessary to permit conviction based on
constructive rather than actual possession requires the facts per-
mit the inference of an intent to possess.177
The court determined that K.S.'s knowledge of and proximity to the
alcohol, standing alone, were not enough to establish actual possession
"without some evidence that K.S. was there to drink."' 78
The court held that "possession" under section 5-01-08 of the North
Dakota Century Code requires the exercise of some actual dominion and
control over an alcoholic beverage.7' The evidence presented failed to
show that K.S. exercised any actual dominion and control over an alco-
170. Id.
171. Id. at 605.
172. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 605.
173. Id at 606.
174. Id. at 607.
175. Id&
176. 322 N.W.2d 502 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
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holic beverage. 180 The court stated that K.S.'s "mere presence in a house
where alcohol is accessible, without any actual control of the alcohol, is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a determination of minor in
possession of alcohol."''
The juvenile court's order was affirmed. 8 '
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
State v. Ackerman
In State v. Ackerman," the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
a social guest in a private home has a legitimate expectation of privacy and
standing to seek suppression of evidence seized therein.1' Further, the
court held that the fears of the investigating police officers that evidence
will be destroyed before a warrant is obtained do not justify a warrantless
entry of the premises. 185
On August 27, 1991, police officers were dispatched to investigate a
loud party in a trailer house.1 86 The three investigating officers heard
loud music coming from the trailer and smelled an odor of marijuana
emanating from the trailer.' a
One of the officers knocked on the front door, which was answered
by the owner of the trailer.'8 8 The owner attempted to prevent the
officer from entering the premises and asked for a search warrant. 8 9 The
officers entered the trailer without a warrant."' Inside the trailer, an
officer saw the defendant put his foot on top of an item of drug parapher-
nalia.' The officers saw nothing illegal prior to entering the trailer
house.'9 2 The defendant "was arrested and charged with possession of
drug paraphernalia."'3 The defendant appealed his conviction of pos-
session of drug paraphernalia and alleged that, as a social guest in a pri-
vate home subject to a warrantless intrusion, he had standing to move to
suppress evidence obtained in the search.1 4 The defendant also con-
180. I-
181. Id.
182. In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d at 608.
183. 499 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1993).
184. State v. Ackerman, 499 N.W.2d 882, 885 (N.D. 1993).
185. 1l at 886.
186. Id. at 883.
187. Id









tended that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence.'
The court found that the defendant had standing to bring the motion
to suppress evidence. 196 The court stated that in order to be protected by
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the person
claiming such protection must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place.9'9 The court determined that both short-term guests,
and overnight guests in another's home have a recognizable privacy inter-
est in that home.'
The court further found that no exigent circumstances existed which
would justify the warrantless entiy.' 99 Because the officers were in the
trailer for over an hour before the arrests were made, the search could not
be classified as a legal warrantless search incident to arrest.2°° The war-
rantless search also was not justified by the plain view exception since the
drug paraphernalia was not in plain view until the officers entered the
trailer.2°l
The investigating officers testified that they feared the evidence
would be destroyed before they could get a warrant to search the trailer
house. 02 The supreme Court stated that in some situations, the immi-
nent destruction of evidence may constitute exigent circumstances that
overcome the presumptive unreasonableness of a warrantless home
entry.203 However, in this case, the officers' fears were mere speculation
about possibilities and did not justify the warrantless search. °4 Quoting
State v. Nagel,205 the court stated, " [w]hen destruction of evidence is the
exigent circumstance, there must be more than a mere belief that such
destruction is probable, coupled with the fact that the suspects know or
will soon become aware that the police are on their trail."206
The court stated that the police officers' belief that they had prob-
able cause to justify a warrantless intrusion was not a sufficient probable
cause determination.20 7 Rather, this was a determination to be made by a
"disinterested magistrate."208
195. Id at 885.
196. L
197. Id
198. Ackerman, 499 N.W. 2d at 885.
199. Id at 886.
200. Id at 885.
201. Id.
202. Id
203. Ackerman, 499 N.W.2d at 886.
204. Id
205. 308 N.W.2d 539 (N.D. 1981).
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The decision of the trial court was reversed. 0 9
CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING
State v. Thompson
In State v. Thompson,2 10 Ronald Scott Thompson appealed a trial
judge's sentence that did not follow the state's nonbinding recommenda-
tion for sentencing.211 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court, stating that a binding plea agreement and a nonbinding recom-
mendation are not the same thing.
212
Thompson entered the home of a Bismarck woman on the morning
of December 20, 1991.213 He pulled. the victim from her shower and
forced her to engage in an oral sex act.2 14 "The victim was cut with a
knife and suffered other physical injuries."215 After Thompson left, the
victim promptly called the police, and Thompson was arrested. 1
Thompson consented to plead guilty to the charge of gross sexual imposi-
tion in return for the state's recommendation of a six-year prison sen-
tence.217 The maximum allowable sentence for gross sexual imposition is
ten years.
2 18
The judge considered the severity of the crime, the plea, a presen-
tencing investigation, and Thompson's past conduct, before sentencing
Thompson to the maximum allowable time of ten years.21 9
Thompson appealed, alleging that his guilty plea should be with-
drawn because the trial judge did not follow the state's nonbinding rec-
ommendation for sentencing.220 The North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that a binding plea agreement and a nonbinding recommendation
are not the same.221 The obligation of the state is satisfied when the non-
binding recommendation is made.22 The court stated that it is not in the
public interest to allow the defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea
"as a matter of right because a court did not follow a nonbinding sentence
recommendation."'' 3
209. Id at 887.
210. 504 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 1993).
211. State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 315, 319 (N.D. 1993).
212. Id
213. Id. at 316.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d at 316-17.
217. Id.
218. Id at 316 n. 2 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01 3) (1985)).
219. Id. at 318.
220. Id. at 316.
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The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the district court.2-
CRIMINAL LAW-TERRORIZING AND ASSAULT
State v. Hondl
In State v. Hondl,' the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
assault is not a lesser included offense of terrorizing. 2
8
The defendant entered the car of a woman while she was driving
"and became physically and verbally abusive toward her."227 After the car
stopped, Hondl straddled the woman on the ground, grabbed at her
crotch area and threatened her.228 The woman reported the incident to
the police.22 9 When the police officers went to Hondl's parents' resi-
dence to arrest him, Hondl demanded an arrest warrant, jerked free from
the hold of a police officer, and attempted to flee.3a0 Hondl physically
struggled with both officers and attempted to brace himself against the
wall to prevent being removed from the house.231 Hondl's mother was
knocked to the ground twice and one of the police officers suffered a
hand injury caused by Hondl.A
Hondl was charged with and convicted of terrorizing and preventing
arrest.23 The defendant appealed both convictions and alleged that the
district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the crime of assault,
which he contended was a lesser included offense of terrorizingY2' The
defendant also contended that the evidence of preventing arrest did not
support his conviction.2-
The supreme court determined that terrorizing 6 "proscribes threats
to commit crimes of violence or acts dangerous to human life, regardless
224. Id Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, expressing his concern that Rule 11(d) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure should be changed to require the judge who chooses not
to accept the plea agreement to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea and be tried for the
offense. Id.
Justice Levine dissented, expressing similar concerns to Justice VandeWalle. Id. at 320. Justice
Levine cited People v. Killebrew, 330 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. 1982), for the proposition that "most
defendants rely on the prosecutor's ability to secure the sentence when offering a guilty plea." Id
justice Levine stated that when the court does not accept the prosecutor's recommendation, the
defendant should be allowed to "withdraw the gui ty plea and exercise [the] constitutional right to a
juiy trial, or the defendant may affirm the guilty plea and accept the sentence imposed by the judge."
ITY
225. 506 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1993).
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of whether the victim actually suffers physical harm," whereas assault
"must either involve some degree of physical injury or must involve a fire-
arm or some other destructive device."
z2 7
Thus, the court held that, "[b]ecause one may terrorize without caus-
ing physical injury and without utilizing ... [a] destructive device, it is
possible to terrorize without having committed an assault. In light of the
distinct elements of the offenses, therefore, assault cannot be considered
a lesser included offense of terrorizing."2 -
The court also found that the record contained sufficient competent
evidence to permit the jury to reasonably infer that the defendant
intended "to 'prevent a public servant from effecting an arrest' and
thereby created 'a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or
anyone except himself, or employ[ed] means justifying or requiring sub-
stantial force to overcome his resistance.' "29
The convictions were affirmed.240
CRIMINAL LAW-THEFr
State v. Ensz
In State v. Ensz, 4 ' the North Dakota Supreme Court held that in
some instances, the original or replacement cost of stolen property is an
appropriate measure of its value.m
The defendant appealed her conviction of theft of property having a
value of $500 or more.m The defendant contended that market value
should have been used to value the stolen property.244
In September, 1991, Kevin Bender realized that some merchandise
was missing from his storage locker in the basement of his apartment
building.m Bender's downhill ski equipment was included in the missing
merchandise.2 4 6 The Bismarck Police Department instructed Bender to
look for his merchandise at the local pawn shops. 47 Bender notified the
police after he found the ski equipment at Jay's Pawn Shop.24 The police
tracked the ski equipment to Ensz via a pawn ticket with her name.249
237. Id. at 407.
238. 1I
239. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-02 (1985)).
240. Id. at 407.
241. 503 N.W.2d 236 (N.D. 1993).
242. State v. Ensz, 503 N.W.2d 236, 239 (N.D. 1993).
243. 1& at 238 n.2 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-23-05(2)(a) (1989) (providing that theft of
property having a value of between $500 and $9,999.99 is a class C felony)).
244. id.
245. 1I at 237.
246. 1I





Ensz was taken into custody and charged "with theft of property having a
value of $500 or more, a class C felony," under sections 12.1-23-02 and
12.1-23-05(2)(a) of the North Dakota Century Code.2-0
The court explained that the North Dakota Criminal Code of 1973
consolidated the theft offenses.251 The consolidation included determin-
ing the amount of the property involved in the theft as the "highest value
by any reasonable standard."2 5 2 The court construed "market value to not
necessarily be the highest value by any reasonable standard." The court
concluded that in some circumstances, "the original or replacement cost
of the stolen merchandise is the appropriate measure of value. ' 53 The
court upheld Ensz's conviction, finding that a rational fact finder could
reasonably infer that the value of the ski equipment exceeded $500.00.
CRIMINAL LAW-VEHICLE STOPS
State v. Brown
In State v. Brown,254 the North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that the requirement that "[a police] officer must have an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violating the law in order to legally
stop a vehicle... requires less than probable cause but more than a mere
hunch."25 s The court also held that, in some circumstances, an officer
without a reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity may be justified in
stopping a vehicle to offer assistance, but the facts and evidence must
show that the officer made the stop primarily to offer such assistance.256
In Brown, the state "appealed from a county court order suppressing
evidence and dismissing charges brought against Roger L. Brown for driv-
ig while under the influence of alcohol" and against Mr. Close for minor
in possession of alcohol.257 At about 1:00 a.m., on a highway outside of
Langdon, North Dakota, a police officer observed a Blazer traveling south
at about forty miles per hour and saw what appeared to be smoke "coming
out from underneath the vehicle."258 The officer watched the vehicle
move about half way on to the right shoulder of the road as it proceeded
down the highway.2 59 The officer turned on his red lights and, nearly
250. l
251. Id. at 238.
252. Ensz, 503 NAV.2d at 238
253. Id. at 239.
254. 509 N.W.2d 69 (N.D. 1993).
255. State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D. 1993) (citing State v. Vande Hoven, 388 N.W.2d
857 (N.D. 1986); State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D. 1992)).
256. Id. at 72.
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simultaneously, the driver of the Blazer activated his right turn signal and
turned off the highway onto the lot of a concrete plant.26°
The officer testified that he stopped the Blazer because it was travel-
ing at less than normal speed, drove onto the shoulder of the road, and
had smoke coming out from under it.26 1 The officer stated that those
factors indicated to him that the driver was either under the influence of
alcohol or was having car problems. 26 2 The officer further testified that
prior to the stop, the driver of the Blazer had not violated any traffic
regulations. 263 Brown, the driver of the Blazer, testified that before he
turned off the highway, he had observed a car following him but he did
not know that it was a patrol car or that the red lights were activated.Y'
Based on observations made after the stop, the defendants were
arrested for their respective offenses.26 The defendants filed a motion to
suppress the evidence arguing that the officer's stop was illegal.2 66 The
trial court found for the defendants and determined that the primary pur-
pose of the stop was to investigate possible criminal activity and not to
offer assistance. 67 Therefore, the court determined that the officer did
not have the articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is violat-
ing the law necessary to justify the stop.26 The state appealed the court's
determination.269
The North Dakota Supreme Court clarified that the "articulable and
reasonable suspicion" standard "requires less than probable cause but
more than a mere hunch."270 The court found that the driver's pulling
over on to the shoulder was reasonable because he did so at a place where
the road curved and it was natural for him to pull over so as to allow the
vehicle behind him to pass while he executed the turn.27' The court con-
tinued, stating that "[tihe mere fact that a driver is traveling at a slower
than usual speed on a roadway does not by itself create a reasonable sus-
picion of driving under the influence[.]" 7 2 The court, therefore, affirmed
the trial court's determination that the officer lacked the "reasonable and
articulable suspicion to make an investigative stop of [the defendant's
vehicle][.]" 273
260. Brown, 509 N.W.2d at 70.
261. 1d. at 70-71.
262. Id. at 71.
263. Id.
264. id.
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Based on the officer's testimony that he did not believe that the
defendant's vehicle was on fire and the fact that the officer did not testify
that he believed there was any emergency or imminent need for assist-
ance, the court determined that the stop also could not be justified "on
the ground that it was a community caretaking stop for the purpose of
providing assistance.1
27 4
The decision of the trial court was affirmed." 5
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-IN-KIND INCOME
Spilovoy v. Spilovoy
In Spilovoy v. Spilovoy,27 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court limited
its previous interpretation of in-kind income. 7 7
Richard and Beverlee Spilovoy were divorced in 1990 and the court
awarded split custody of the couple's children.278 "Richard and Beverlee
agreed that Richard would pay Beverlee $900 per month child support
. . . [while] Beverlee would not pay child support to Richard .... 279
Richard moved "to reduce his child support [obligation] . . . and to
require Beverlee to pay child support." 0 Beverlee had remarried and
had one child with her new husband.2' She was not employed outside
the home.2 8 2 "The trial court reduced Richard's child support obligation
to $600 per month .... and ordered Beverlee to pay $10.00 per month
[child support]."
Richard contended on appeal "that the trial court erred in sub-
tracting the value of Beverlee's contribution to the marital enterprise
from the in-kind income contributed to her by her spouse."2s 4 Richard
relied on the court's decision in Clutter v. McIntoshm which applied an
expansive interpretation of "'in-kind income' of an obligor-parent who
has remarried and does not work outside the home."28  In Clutter, the
court stated that "[c]ontributed living expenses to be counted as in-kind
income include more than the cost of housing and transportation ....
Anything else that 'allows the obligor to avoid ordinary living expenses'
274. Id. at 72.
275. Id
276. 511 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1994).
277. Spiovoy v. Spflovoy, 511 N.W.2d 230,233 (N.D. 1994).
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should be counted. 28 7 The Clutter decision suggested that items such as
clothing, furniture, church, charitable contributions, YMCA member-
ships, vacations, life and disability insurance, housing, taxes, utilities, car
payments, car maintenance, car insurance, gas, and groceries were to be
considered as in-kind income.2 8
The supreme court in Spilovoy however, determined that the Clutter
decision "carried the concept of in-kind income contributed by a child
support obligor's spouse too far."2 9 Although the North Dakota child
support guidelines do not explicitly take into account the income of a new
spouse, they do require courts to consider in-kind income contributed by
an obligor's spouse. 90
In-kind income is defined as:
[Tihe receipt of any valuable right, property or property inter-
est, other than money or money's worth, including, but not lim-
ited to forgiveness of debt (other than through bankruptcy), use
of property, including living quarters at no charge or less than
the customary charge, and the use of consumable property at no
charge or less than the customary charge.
2 91
The court found that the Clutter construction of in-kind income
posed problems in application.29 2 The court thus determined that in-kind
income should be construed to include only basic living expenses, the
value of which to the obligor is relatively easy to measure and which are
unlikely to lead to a de facto requirement of stepparent support of chil-
dren not residing in the obligor's household. Ordinarily, in-kind income
contributed by a spouse should be limited to food, shelter, utilities, cloth-
ing, health care, and transportation. 93
The court noted that including only those specific items as in-kind
income would prevent the problems of uneven results and unpredictabil-
ity that the child support guidelines were designed to eliminate.294
The decision of the trial court was reversed and remanded.2 95
287. Id. (quoting Clutter, 484 N.W.2d at 852).
288. Spilovoy, 511 N.W.2d at 233.
289. L
290. I& at 233, 234.
291. Id. at 232 (quoting N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(3)).
292. Spilovoy, 511 N.W.2d at 233.
293. Id.
294. Id
295. Id. at 235.
[Vol. 70:689
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATION
Rueckert v. Rueckert
In Rueckert v. Rueckert,2 96 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the time frame for measuring material change of circumstances for
purposes of a motion to modify child support is from the date of the origi-
nal divorce decree or actual modification, not from the date of denial of a
previous motion to modify.
2 97
The plaintiff, Mr. Rueckert, "appealed from a district court order
confirming a judicial referee's denial of his motion to modify [Mrs.]
Rueckert's child support obligation." 298 At the time of the parties' 1987
divorce, Mr. Rueckert was earning about $19,000 per year and Ms.
Rueckert was earning less than minimum wage.2 99 'Pursuant to a stipula-
tion between the parties, the divorce decree granted [Mr. Rueckert] phys-
ical custody of the couple's two minor children and provided that 'in lieu
of child support,' Mrs. Rueckert makes no claim to and [Mr. Rueckert] is
awarded the couple's trailer home" and Mrs. Rueckert relinquished any
interest in Mr. Rueckert's pension.300
Later, Mrs. Rueckert sought a change of custody and Mr. Rueckert
sought child support from Mrs. Rueckert. 301 In 1991, the district court
entered an order denying Mrs. Rueckert's motion for change of custody
and Mr. Rueckert's motion seeking child support from Mrs. Rueckert.30 2
In 1992, Mr. Rueckert again filed a motion seeking child support alleging
a material change in circumstances.30 3 A judicial referee found that since
the time of Mr. Rueckert's 1991 motion, Mrs. Rueckert had not incurred
a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of
child support and denied Mr. Rueckert's motion.3° The district court
denied review of the referee's decision, finding that Mr. Rueckert's
request was untimely; Mr. Rueckert appealed. 0 5
The supreme court stated that although settlements are encouraged
in divorce actions, the court "[t]ake[s] a dim view of agreements purport-
ing to sign away the rights of a child in support settings."308 The court
pointed out that although a court normally does not have continuing juris-
296. 499 N.W. 2d 863 (N.D. 1993).
297. Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 868 (N.D. 1993).
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diction to modify a property distribution in a divorce decree, it does retain
jurisdiction to modify child support.3 0 7
The court held that "parental agreements which prohibit or limit the
power of a court to modify future child support are invalid. 308 There-
fore, the court found the child support stipulation in the Rueckert's
divorce decree to be in violation of public policy and thus invalid.30 9
Mrs. Rueckert, however, asserted that the referee's decision should
be allowed to stand because there were no material changes in circum-
stances since January 1991.1 Mr. Rueckert opposed this and argued
that the referee erred in requiring him to show a change in circumstances
since the January 1991 order denying his motion to modify child sup-
port.311 Instead, Mr. Rueckert asserted that the correct time frame for
determining a material change in circumstances is from either the original
child support decree or from the date of an actual modification. 12
The court agreed with Mr. Rueckert and held that "the time for
determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred is
from the original decree, or any actual modification."3 x3 The court
stressed the importance of allowing children to benefit from several incre-
mental changes in circumstances, any of which alone would be insuffi-
cient to justify a modification of child support, but when considered in
totality would justify such a modification.31 4
The decision of the judicial referee was reversed and remanded.315
Reimer v. Reimer
In Reimer v. Reimer,316 a divorce decree relinquishing the ex-wife's
interest in marital property in lieu of paying child support was held by the
North Dakota Supreme Court to contravene the ex-wife's legal duty to
provide support for her children, and thus, was invalid. 1
The parties were married in 1978 and had three children prior to
their 1988 divorce.3 18 The divorce decree gave the parties joint custody
and the ex-husband physical custody of the children. 1 ' The parties
agreed in the divorce decree that the ex-wife would give up her interest in
307. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d at 867.
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the marital property and, due to her low economic and student status,
would not be required to pay child support. 20 In the time between the
order of the divorce decree and the commencement of this action, the ex-
wife graduated from a technical college and obtained regular
employment.32'
In May 1992, the custodial parent moved to have the divorce decree
modified to require his ex-wife to pay child support under the current
child support guidelines.3" The ex-wife opposed the motion on the basis
that the ex-husband should not be allowed to enjoy the benefit of their
agreement at the time of the divorce and later receive additional sup-
port.3z The trial court held that a material change in circumstances did
exist but because such a change may have been c ontemplated at the time
of the agreement's formation, it remained an equitable settlement.
32
The ex-husband appealed and the supreme court reversed and
remanded. 32'
The Court explained that section 14-09-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides: "[plarents shall give their children support and-
education suitable to the child's circumstances."32 Following a divorce
decree, a trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support
upon a material change in circumstances. 327 However, the trial court
does not retain continuing jurisdiction to modify a decreed property
distribution.32
Relying on their 1993 decision in Ruekert v. Ruekert,32 9 the court
stated that the continuing power to modify child support is elevated over
the lack of power to change an agreed-upon property distribution if doing
so is necessary to implement child support. °3 The court also stated that
"parental agreements that prohibit or limit the power of the court to mod-
ify future child support are invalid," because the best interests of the child
necessitate the court's exercise of continuing jurisdiction to modify child
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330. Reimer, 502 N.W.2d at 232.
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The ex-wife also argued that the custodial parent was employed full-
time with a $1400 monthly income and made "no showing of detriment to
the minor children."3 The court held that detriment to the child is
clearly not a pre-condition of child support. '  Child support guidelines
presume that the specified amount of support owed to a child by the
custodial parent can only be decreased if there is undue hardship on the
obligor or increased if the child for whom support is sought is unduly
burdened.33 This presumption may be rebutted by factors not consid-
ered by the guidelines. 8 Unless a specific finding of hardship to the
obligor is shown, a custodial parent's income is irrelevant to the noncus-
todial parent's child support obligation. 7
The court instructed the trial court upon remand to calculate the ex-
wife's child support obligation based on an equitable off-set remedy. u s
Under this remedy, the trial court must make an evaluation of the "[ex-
wife's] interest in the marital property that she relinquished in lieu of
child support, calculate the amount of child support that would have been
correct from the original decree to the date of the ex-husband's latest
motion to modify, compute the ex-wife's child support obligation since
the date of that motion under the guidelines, and offset the value of her
share of the marital property waived."33
The court noted,
[flor this purpose, the trial court is not modifying accrued, but
unpaid, child support. Instead, the trial court must determine
what child support was effectively prepaid by the property
agreement, and order [the ex-wife's] payment of child support
to commence after the offsetting credit is used up, or upon [the
ex-husband's] most recent motion, whichever is later.3 0
The decision of the trial court was reversed and remanded.31
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Reimer, 502 N.W. 2d at 233.
336. I&
337. Id
338. Id. at 234.
339. id




FAMILY LAW-MARITAL PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION IN DIVORCE
SETTLEMENTS
Sullivan v. Quist
In Sullivan v. Quist,3 the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that based on strong public policy concerns emphasizing the right
of the child to parental support, a showing of a material change of circum-
stances is not necessary as a prerequisite to modify an original decree that
provides no child support.34" The court also determined that a settlement
agreement which "is wholly incorporated into the divorce judgment is
merged into that judgment and ceases to be independently viable and
enforceable."-3
Peter and Mary Ann Quist were divorced pursuant to a stipulation
drafted by Peter.34 The stipulation was wholly incorporated into the
divorce decree.346 The decree awarded joint legal custody of the children
to Peter and Mary Ann.347 Two minor children were to reside with Mary
Ann and one minor and two adult children were to reside with Peter.348
No child support was awarded to either Peter or Mary Ann." 9 In the
years following the divorce, the children moved back and forth between
Peter and Mary Ann.-' The minor child, however, remained with Mary
Ann at all times." Mary Ann moved for child support, claiming that she
was entitled to support for the minor child who had resided with her at all
times.-"' The trial court denied Mary Ann's motion based on her failure
to show a material change in circumstances.? Mary Ann appealed, argu-
ing that the trial court failed in finding no material change in
circumstances.3
The supreme court first determined whether it is necessary to show a
material change of circumstances for modification of a child support
agreement made between the parties which stipulates away a child's right
to support., s The court stressed that there is a strong public policy
against divorce settlements that compromise child support, and it empha-
342. 506 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1993).
343. Sullivan v. Quist, 506 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D. 1993).
344. Id. at 399.
345. Id. at 396.
346. Id
347. Id




352. Id at 396-97.
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sized that the right to support is a right that belongs to the child.as6 Based
on these concerns, the court determined that "it is unnecessary to show a
material change of circumstances as a prerequisite to modification of an
original decree that provides no child support." a'
The divorce decree also provided that the marital home, valued at
$150,000 at the time of the divorce with a $30,000 mortgage, was to be
sold. Each party was to receive $60,000 in equity, with Peter to receive
any increase when the house was sold.35 The house eventually sold for
less than $15 0,0 00 .a9 The trial court ordered that the proceeds from the
sale of the house were to be divided equally between Peter and Mary
Ann."6 On appeal, Mary Ann asserted that the stipulation which was
incorporated into the decree gave her a constant $60,000 equity interest
in the house and that her interest should not be affected because the
house sold for less than $150,000.311 Peter asserted that his intent in
drafting the agreement was that Mary Ann's equity interest would remain
constant if the house increased in value and that the parties did not con-
template the house selling for less than $150,000.362
The supreme court determined that a settlement agreement that is
wholly incorporated into the divorce judgment is "merged into that judg-
ment and ceases to be independently viable and enforceable." a M "Once
the settlement agreement is merged into the divorce decree, it is inter-
preted and enforced as a final judgment of the court, not as a separate
contract between the parties. ' 3
The court stated that in interpreting judgments, plain and unambigu-
ous language must be enforced in light of its literal meaning.'65 The court
determined that the judgment's plain and unambiguous language
required that Mary Ann was to receive $60,000 in equity from the house
even if its value declined. 66 The court also stated that Peter's intent
when drafting the stipulation was irrelevant because the stipulation had
been incorporated into the divorce decree.361
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Sullivan, 506 N.W.2d at 396.
359. Id
360. Id.
361. Id. at 399. The relevant portion of the divorce decree stated that "[t]he plaintiff's Sixty
Thousand dollars ($60,000.00) equity interest shall not appreciate or increase in value, but shall
remain constant in value." Id. at 400.
362. Id at 399.
363. Sullivan, 506 N.W.2d at 399.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 401.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 402.
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The trial court's denial of child support was reversed and remanded
for application of the child support guidelines.3 8 The portion of the
judgment ordering equal division of the proceeds from the sale of the
house was reversed and remanded.38 9
INHERENT POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Center
In Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Center,37 the North Dakota
Supreme Court determined that a trial court is given broad discretion to
exercise its inherent power to sanction, but sanctions should be imposed
only after balancing the relative degrees of culpability and prejudice to
the parties.37' The sanctions ultimately imposed must be the least restric-
tive under the circumstances.3'2
Bachmeier sued PACCAR, Inc. under claims of products liability,
breach of warranty, and negligence after his son died as a passenger in a
truck manufactured by PACCAR. 37 The probable cause of the accident
was the breaking of the right front hub of the truck.3 4 Bachmeier also
brought a wrongful death action against the owner of the truck.375 Dur-
ing that action, the owner's insurer gave the hub to an expert for analy-
sis. 37 6 After the wrongful death claim was settled between Bachmeier
and the owner, the insurer told the expert he could dispose of the parts in
his possession.3 ' The hub was disposed of at that time. 78
The products liability suit against PACCAR was commenced about
two months after the hub was destroyed.3 9 The suit was based on a
design defect theory. 0 PACCAR moved for summary judgment.-" The
summary judgment motion was based on two theories: first, that
Bachmeier's failure to preserve the hub resulted in unreasonable preju-
dice to PACCAR by depriving it of its opportunity to examine the hub,
and second, that without the hub, Bachmeier was unable to prove his
design defect claim.
368. Sullivan, 506 N.W. 2d at 402.
369. Id.
370. 507 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1993).
371. Bachmeier v. Wallwork Truck Ctr., 507 N.W.2d 527, 535 (N.D. 1993).
372. Id.
373. Id at 530.
374. Id.
375. Id





381. Bachmeier, 507 N.W.2d at 530.
382. Id
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On September 2, 1992, the trial court denied PACCAR's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that some evidence of PACCAR's liability was
in dispute.3  The court acknowledged that the destruction of the hub
could result in prejudice to PACCAR, but stated that the extent of that
prejudice could best be determined at trial.3 4 The court reserved the
right to reconsider its decision.3a
On January 15, 1993, on its own motion, the trial court reconsidered
its earlier decision.3 6 After reconsidering its earlier decision, the trial
court granted PACCAR's summary judgment motion.38 7  Bachmeier
appealed the trial court decision.
3 88
The supreme court determined that the trial court's authority to
render its decision did not flow from either Rule 37 or 56 of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and, as such, could only be understood
under an exercise of its inherent power to sanction.3 s9 Although the court
recognized that a trial court's inherent power to sanction may be appro-
priate when evidence relevant to the lawsuit is destroyed, it determined
that a trial court has a duty to impose the least restrictive sanction avail-
able under the circumstances.3 9 0 The court stated that "[d]ismissal of the
entire case with prejudice is perhaps the most restrictive sanction which
exists .... We prefer that disputes be settled on the merits."39'
The court then discussed two goals behind the issuance of sanctions:
1) to penalize those whose conduct warrants such action, and 2) to deter
others from similar conduct.3 12 Dismissal of a case under Rule 37
requires that dismissal be based on a showing of deliberate conduct or
bad faith.3 3 This is distinguished from dismissal based on the court's
inherent power to sanction, which requires no such showing.3 4 Rather,
the court is given broad discretion in determining when to sanction and
which sanctions are appropriate.3 95 Decisions must be made on a case-
by-case basis. 96 Valid considerations include, but are not limited to: the
culpability, or state of mind, of the party against whom sanctions are
being imposed; a finding of prejudice against the moving party, and the
degree of this prejudice, including the impact it has on presenting or
383. Id. at 530-531.
384. Id. at 531.
385. I&









395. Id. at 534.
396. Bachmeier, 507 N.W.2d at 534.
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defending the case; and, the availability of less severe alternative
sanctions.397
The supreme court determined that the trial court failed to balance
the degree of PACCAR's prejudice against the degree of Bachmeier's cul-
pability and did not sufficiently articulate the facts and legal issues
involved.398
The decision of the trial court was reversed and remanded.3 99
INSURANCE COVERAGE
Dvorak v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
In Dvorak v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,400 the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that "an insurer's duty to its policyholders to
negotiate a settlement of a potential claim in good faith and with fair deal-
ing does not extend to injured" claimants who have no contractual rela-
tionship with the insurer.4°'
Kim Dvorak was injured when a vehicle drove over her foot.402 "The
vehicle was insured by American."4 °3 American's adjuster offered the
Dvoraks $5,000 in settlement for Ms. Dvorak's injuries. °M The adjuster
noted that he had been "[flollowing closely with the attending physicians
Kim's progression with respect to her injury." 05 The Dvoraks
rejected this offer.406
About three months later, American offered to settle with the
Dvoraks for the policy liability limit of $25,000.40' The adjuster's letter to
the Dvoraks stated that the no-fault Personal Injury Protection provision
of the insurance policy Would continue to cover Ms. Dvorak's medical
expenses to a limit of $30,000.41s The Dvoraks accepted this offer and
settled with American. 4°
Thereafter, the Dvoraks sued American for damages, complaining
that American's initial settlement offer was so low that it constituted "a
breach of contract, actual fraud, constructive fraud, deceit, negligence, a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith, arbitrary, unreasonable, and
397. 1a&
398. Id.
399. id. at 535.
400. 508 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1993).
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vexatious conduct and bad faith."410 The trial court granted American's
summary judgment motion to dismissing the plaintiff's claims.
41'
The supreme court upheld the trial court's decision and determined
that American had no duty to act in good faith with the Dvoraks, stating
that "[a]n insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing is owed to the
insured, but not to third party claimants."41 The court also stated that in
the absence of a clause in an insurance policy giving a right to bring a
direct action against the insurer, "an injured party's claim must be
asserted against the torifeasor, not the tortfeasor's insurer."
413
The court pointed out that an insurer's duty to negotiate in good
faith arises out of its contractual responsibility to the insured.414 Thus,
because the Dvoraks were not the intended claimants or third party bene-
ficiaries under the insurance contract, but were only incidental benefi-
ciaries, their claim was against the insured, not the insurer.
415
The Dvoraks also asserted that they had raised viable claims of fraud
and deceit.416 The court stated that fraud and deceit are substantially
identical, with fraud applying to misrepresentation between parties to a
contract and deceit applying when there is no contract between the
parties.417
The court continued, stating that "[a] key element in proving fraud
or deceit is reliance by the complaining party upon the false or misleading
misrepresentation." 4"8 The Dvoraks' deceit claim failed because there
was no evidence of reliance on the adjuster's misstatement of fact that
accompanied American's first settlement offer.419 They did not accept
the first settlement offer; therefore, they did not rely upon the adjuster's
statement.420
The decision of the trial court was affirmed.4e '
410. 1&
411. Dvorak, 508 N.W.2d at 331.
412. 1&
413. Id.
414. Id at 332.
415. Id.










In In re B.D.,41 the North Dakota Supreme Court emphasized that
North Dakota law requires the "least restrictive form," not the least intru-
sive form, when ordering involuntary medical treatment.
4 3
A petition for involuntary commitment of B.D. was brought in
December 1993.4 4 The petition alleged that B.D. was believed to be
mentally ill, had a history of chronic schizophrenia and severe high blood
pressure, was refusing to take his medications for these disorders, and was
a threat to himself.4" The petition also stated petitioner's belief that
B.D. was a threat to his family and others.426
The county court found probable cause that B.D. was mentally ill
and ordered hospitalization for fourteen days. 4' A treatment hearing fol-
lowed later that month at which the county court ordered that B.D. be
committed to a hospital for ninety days and authorized the treatment of
B.D. with prescribed medications. 42 On appeal, B.D. challenged the suf-
ficiency of the evidence on which the court ordered B.D. to be hospital-
ized and the order authorizing forced medications. 4 9
For a court to order involuntary treatment, it must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence that the person to be committed requires
treatment.430 In order to prove that a person requires treatment, it must
be shown: 1) that the individual is mentally ill; and 2) that if the individ-
ual is not hospitalized, there is a serious risk that the individual will cause
harm to himself, to others, or to property.431 Both of these elements must
be proven before involuntary treatment may be ordered; it is not enough
to show only that an individual is mentally ill. 432
The court examined the evidence from the trial court, including
statements which established that B.D. had been involuntarily hospital-
ized on two prior occasions after he had stopped taking his medications,
that B.D. had threatened his father and others, that he had stopped eat-
ing, and that he had concealed a knife in his shoe while in the hospital
422. 510 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1994).
423. In re B.D., 510 N.W.2d 629. 633 (N.D.1994) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-18.1
(1)(a)(3) (Supp. 1993)).
424. Id. at 630.
425. Id
426. Id. at 631.
427. Id
428. In re B.D., 510 N.W.2d at 631.
429. Id.
430. Id (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-19) (Supp. 1993)).
431. Id (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-02) (Supp. 1993)).
432. In re B.D., 510 N.W.2d at 631.
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during the fourteen-day period before the treatment hearing.433 The
court found the totality of the evidence sufficient to uphold the trial
court's determination that B.D. was a person requiring treatment, as
defined in section 25-03.1-02(11) of the North Dakota Century Code.4"
The respondent next argued that the evidence presented to the trial
court was "insufficient to find that forced medication is the least restric-
tive form of intervention necessary to meet the treatment needs of B.D.,"
as required by section 25-03.1-18.1 (1)(a)(3) of the North Dakota Century
Code.' B.D. asserted that the least restrictive form of treatment would
be the treatment that he wanted.-"' Because he did not want to receive
injected medications, the injected medication could not be considered the
least restrictive form of treatment.437 The court refused to apply B.D.'s
subjective interpretation of "least restrictive means" and stated that
"under circumstances where a respondent's judgment might well be
impaired, we believe a more objective standard is appropriate."' 38
The court emphasized that North Dakota's involuntary treatment
"statute calls for the 'least restrictive form of intervention', not the least
intrusive form."439 The court determined that forced treatment with
injected medications was appropriate even though it was more intrusive
than treatments without injections, based on evidence that clearly and
convincingly established that no other treatment would meet the needs of
B.D.440
The trial court did not specify in the request for authorization of
treatment which prescribed medications that B.D. was to receive."41 As
such, the supreme court remanded for a modification of the county
court's order to include medication specifications."
2
The order of the county court was affirmed. 4 "'
JURY PANEL COMPOSITION
State v. Fredericks
In State v. Fredericks,4 " the North Dakota Supreme Court deter-
mined that a Native American defendant's unsubstantiated assertions that
433. Id. at 631, 632.
434. Id. at 632.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 633.





442. In re B.D., 510 N.W.2d at 634.
443. Id.
444. 507 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1993).
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a county's population was nine percent Native American and that none of
the jury panel that decided his case was Native American were insuffi-
cient to show underrepresentation of a distinct group sufficient to estab-
lish a violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross section
requirement." 5
The defendant, a Native American, was tried in Dunn County and
convicted of actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol." 6 Prior to voir dire selection on the day of trial, the
defendant filed a motion challenging the jury panel." 7 He alleged that
the jury panel did not accurately or fairly represent the ethnic diversity of
the county.44 He argued that there were no Native Americans on the
panel, while Dunn County was composed of nine percent Native Ameri-
cans.4 9 The trial court denied the defendant's request to stay the
proceedings. 50
On appeal, the defendant challenged the statutory procedure under
which Dunn County compiled its juror master list.451 The court deter-
mined that the defendant failed to comply with the statutory procedures
for challenging the jury selection process. 2 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the defendant's conviction could not be overturned.453
The defendant next argued that his Constitutional rights were vio-
lated because the jury panel from which his jury was selected was not a
fair cross section of the community.4-4 The court stated that "a criminal
defendant's right to an impartial jury trial under the Sixth Amendment
requires the selection of the jury from a representative cross section of
the community."45 The elements of a prima facie violation of the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross-section requirement are:
[T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the
representation of this group in venires from which juries are
selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-
representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process. 456
445. State v. Fredericlk, 507 N.W.2d 61, 65 (N.D. 1993).
446. Id at 62-63.
447. Id at 63.
448. Id
449. Id.
450. Fredericks, 507 N.w.2d at 63.
451. Id at 64.
452. Id
453. Id
454. Id at 65.
455. Fredericks, 507 N.W.2d at 64 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)).
456. Id at 65 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
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The court stated that the defendant had presented no evidence to
satisfy the second and third prongs of this test."7 Therefore, the defend-
ant's unsubstantiated assertions were insufficient to prove either an
underrepresentation or a systematic exclusion of that group from the jury
selection process.458 The court stated, "a mere observation that there are
no Native Americans on a jury panel that was drawn from a population
containing Native Americans 'simply is not sufficient to demonstrate any
systematic exclusion.' -4-59
The decision of the trial court was affirmed.460
LANDLORD/TENANT LAw
Community Homes of Bismarck, Inc. v. Quast
In Community Homes of Bismarck, Inc. v. Quast,461 the North
Dakota Supreme Court stated that a defense exists to an eviction action
against a tenant of a federally subsidized housing project, if the tenant is
able to rebut the statutorily mandated showing of good cause to evict by
the landlord.462
The defendant lived in a partially subsidized apartment complex
owned by the plaintiff.46 The defendant did not pay the full amount of
rent due on January 1, 1993 and agreed to pay the remaining balance of
January's rent on February 4.464 The defendant failed to make these pay-
ments on February 4, and also did not pay February's rent.4e On Febru-
ary 11, the plaintiff served a notice to pay or quit, allowing the defendant
to pay the delinquent rent within fourteen days or request a conference
with the plaintiff within five days.46 The defendant failed to take either
action.467 On February 26, the plaintiff began eviction proceedings. 4
On March 1, the defendant attempted to pay her past-due rent for
January and February.469 However, rent for March was also due on that
date and the plaintiff refused to accept partial payment.470 On March 2,
the defendant attempted to pay rent for all three months, but the plaintiff
457. i&
458. I&
459. 1d (quoting United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 1991)).
460. Fredeiicks, 507 N.W.2d at 65.
461. 510 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1994).
462. Community Homes of Bismarck, Inc. v. Quast, 510 N.W.2d 648, 649 (N.D. 1994).










rejected the payment due to the defendant's "failure to respond to the
notice to quit."
47'
The trial court found that the defendant had violated a material term
of her lease and ordered her to vacate the property and pay restitution to
the plaintiff.472 On appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff did not
have good cause to evict her because the breach of the lease was based on
factors beyond her control when her AFDC check was allegedly stolen
and because she had tendered full payment prior to the eviction
hearing.473
As owner of a federally subsidized housing project, the plaintiff was
required to comply with the federal regulations for such projects.474 The
federal regulations list material noncompliance with a rental agreement as
one of three exclusive grounds for eviction.475 "Material noncompliance
includes non-payment of rent beyond any applicable grace period."476
The federal regulations also require the noncompliance to be serious or
repeated.47
Based on the four missed due dates for rent payment and the tardy
offer of rent after the expiration of the grace period on the notice to quit,
the supreme court affirmed the lower court's finding that "repeated and
serious violations of a material term of the lease had occurred in this
case."4
78
The defendant argued, however, that "a defense exists to an eviction
action for nonpayment of rent if she can rebut the showing of good cause
[to evict, which is imposed on the landlord and which is] required by the
regulation."47 9 The court determined that this defense was available, but
that the defendant had not established sufficient facts to prove that she
was entitled to the defense.4 0
For this defense, a tenant must prove three facts to rebut a
showing of good cause for non-payment of rent: The failure to
pay must be due to circumstances beyond the tenant's control,
prompt notice must be given to the landlord of the tenant's
inability to pay, and the tenant must make diligent efforts to pay
the delinquent rent as soon as possible. 4
471. d
472. Quast, 510 N.W.2d at 649.
473. Id
474. id
475. Id. at 650.
476. Ld. (citing 24 C.F.R. 247-4(c)(4)).
477. Quast, 510 N.W.2d at 650 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 966-4(L)(2)(i)).
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The court determined that two elements of the defense had not been
established by the defendant.48' The court stated that the defendant had
failed to promptly notify the plaintiff of her inability to pay, as evidenced
by her delayed response to the notice to quit.41 The court further stated
that the plaintiff did not prove that nonpayment of rent was due to cir-
cumstances beyond her control, as she did not report the alleged theft of
her AFDC check to the police or produce sufficient credible evidence to
prove that her check was stolen. 4  As such, the supreme court deter-
mined that the defendant did not rebut the plaintiff's showing of good
cause for eviction.as
The decision of the trial court was affirmed. s6
LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Rykowsky v. Dickinson Public School District Number 1
In Rykowsky v. Dickinson Public School District Number 1,487 the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's summary judgment
ruling for the school district and two school board members in an action
for wrongful termination, defamation, and emotional distress.4s
In 1971, Richard Rykowsky was hired by the Dickinson Public
School District.489 In 1974, Rykowsky became the District Supervisor of
Transportation. 490 In 1989, Rykowsky became the "Supervisor for Trans-
portation and Food Service." 491 In January 1990, Rex Cook and Don
Staudinger, members of the school board, both expressed their dissatis-
faction with Rykowsky's job performance at a regular board meeting.
492
In May of 1990, Rykowsky was told that the district would be letting him
go on June 30, 1990.493 Rykowsky sued the District, Cook, and Staud-
inger, claiming wrongful termination and emotional distress.4 94 Rykowsky
also alleged defamation because of the comments of Cook and Staud-
inger.49s The trial court explained that there is no liability for a defama-
482. 1I at 650.
483. Quast, 510 N.W.2d at 650.
484. 1I at 651.
485. id.
486. Idi
487. 508 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1993).





493. Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d at 349.
494. 1I Rykowsky had a third claim ofwrongful termination in which he argued that he was not
an at-will employee. Id The supreme court concluded that -Rykowsky did not raise a genuine issue
as to any material fact about the wrongful termination claim[.]" Id. at 350.
495. Id. at 349.
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tory statement if the statement is privileged,496and that section 14-02-05
of the North Dakota Century Code defines a privileged communication as
one made in an official duty during a proceeding authorized by law.
49 7
On appeal, the supreme court determined that statements about the
job performance of an employee made by school board members during a
scheduled board meeting are privileged communications.498 The court
stated that "[pIrivilege is based upon the sound public policy that some
communications are so socially important that the full and unrestricted
exchange of information requires some latitude for mistake."499
Rykowsky also alleged that he suffered emotional distress from the
statements: 500 The court recognized that both of the tort claims, emo-
tional distress and defamation, came from the same occurrence.5 0 1 The
court also reiterated that one of the torts, defamation, was privileged.50 2
Therefore, the court concluded that since both torts came from the same
occurrence and one of the torts was privileged, the other tort was
barred. 0 3 The court quoted the Delaware Supreme Court, stating that
"'the great weight of foreign precedent [provides] that an independent
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not lie where, as
here, the gravemen of the complaint sounds in defamation.' 504
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision.505
NO-FAULT INSURANCE/CHOICE OF LAW
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange,06 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that Minnesota's no-
fault insurance law applies in a subrogation action related to a Minnesota
accident involving a North Dakota insured motorist and a Minnesota
insured motorist.
507
American Family insured a North Dakota resident driving a North
Dakota licensed vehicle.508 American Family paid its insured no-fault
496. 1&
497. Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d at 350.
498. Id at 351.
499. Id (citing Soentgen v. Quain & Ramstad Clinic, P.C., 467 N.W.2d 73, 78 (N.D. 1991)).
500. Id
501. Id at 352.
502. Rykowsky, 508 N.W.2d at 352.
503. I
504. Id (citing Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1351 (Del. 1992)).
505. Id
506. 504 N.W.2d 307 (N.D. 1993).
507. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 504 N.W.2d 307, 310-311 (N.D. 1993).
508. Id at 308.
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benefits for the injuries he sustained in an accident which occurred in
Minnesota and involved a driver insured by Farmers Insurance Com-
pany.509 American Family then began a declaratory judgment action
against Farmers, seeking subrogation under the North Dakota no-fault
insurance statute.510 The district court dismissed American Family's
claim.511 American Family appealed.
12
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Minnesota,
rather than North Dakota, no-fault laws applied to the subrogation
action.513  The court distinguished a statutory action for subrogation
between two insurers from an action on an insurance contract between an
insured and his insurer.
5 14
In an insured-insurer dispute, the significant contacts test is applied
and "the law of the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts with
an insurance policy and with the parties to the policy will govern actions
on the policy."515 However, the court determined that those contacts are
not controlling in determining which state's law governs a statutory subro-
gation action.5 6 Rather, the court must look to factors beyond the poli-
cies themselves to determine which state's law governs.5 7
The court applied the significant contacts test.518 It looked at both
North Dakota's and Minnesota's statutes and determined that Minnesota
had a deeper interest in the application of no-fault principles for an acci-
dent occurring in that state.519 The court noted the territorial nature of
statutorily mandated no-fault coverage, and stated that the legislative pur-
pose of the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act is "'[tlo
relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of auto-
mobile accidents within this state."',52 0 North Dakota law also contains
provisions mandating no-fault coverage when a vehicle is operated within
the state.52 ' The North Dakota Legislature recognized that "when a vehi-
cle insured in North Dakota is operated in another state, that state's no
fault law comes into play."52 The court found these factors to constitute
509. Id. at 307-08.
510. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26.1-41.
511. Id.
512. Am. Family Mlut., 504 N.W.2d at 307-08.
513. Id. at 311.
514. Id. at 308.
515. Id
516. Id.
517. Am. Family Mut., 504 N.W.2d at 309.
518. Id. The court articulated five factors to be considered in application of a significant
contacts test. These factors are: "1) predictability of results; 2) maintenance of interstate and
international order; 3) simplification of the judicial task; 4) advancement of the forum's governmental
interest; and, 5) application of the better rule of law." Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.42(1)).
521. Id. at 310.
522. Am. Family Mut., 504 N.W.2d at 310.
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an "overridingly significant contact which mandates the application of the
Minnesota law."523
Thus, the court held that no-fault coverage is imposed by law, rather
than by contract, when the accident occurs within a state with no-fault
insurance statutes.524 The court determined that Minnesota had more
significant contacts with the issue of statutory subrogation for no-fault
benefits under the facts of this case.52'
The judgment of the district court was affirmed. 26
RIGHT TO COUNSEL-ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
In the Matter of Adoption of KA.S.
In In re Adoption of KA.S.,52 7 T.D.K. (Tom) appealed the trial
court's order terminating his parental rights and its determination that he
was not entitled to court-appointed counsel because the action was
brought under the Uniform Adoption Act rather than under the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act.5"
In 1983, two years after Tom and D.S. (Debra) were married, Debra
gave birth to K.A.S. (Karl).5 2 9 Three years later, Debra and Tom were
divorced and Debra was awarded custody of Karl. 530 In 1990, Debra
remarried." l In 1991, Debra and her new husband, B.R.S. (Brad)
brought proceedings to terminate Tom's parental rights and to allow Brad
to adopt Karl. 2 The proceedings were brought under the Revised Uni-
form Adoption Act.' Tom did not have sufficient funds to hire his own
attomey.5-4 Because the action was brought under the Uniform Adoption
Act rather than the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, the trial court deter-
mined that it had no obligation to appoint counsel for Tom.
3
The court acknowledged three different sections in the North
Dakota Century Code that allow for the involuntary termination of paren-
tal rights:536 (1) the Uniform Juvenile Act; 5 7 (2) the Uniform Parentage
Act,535 and (3) the Revised Uniform Adoption Act.5 3 9 While the Juvenile
523. Id at 309.
524. Id. at 310.
525. Id.
526. Id. at 311.
527. 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993).









537. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-45 (1991).
538. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-24 (1991).
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Court Act and the Parentage Act give the indigent individual the right to
court-appointed counsel, the Adoption Act does not.5 40 Although the
action was brought under the Adoption Act, Tom argued that the denial
of court-appointed counsel was a violation of his federal due process
rights, as well as a violation of his state due process and equal protection
rights.
541
The court chose not to decide whether the denial of counsel was a
violation of Tom's federal and state due process rights because it found
the denial of counsel to be a violation of Tom's state equal protection
rights.5' Article I Section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution does not
allow privileges to be extended to some citizens unless those privileges are
extended to all citizens.5 43 Although the Juvenile Court Act, the Parent-
age Act, and the Adoption Act all allow for the involuntary termination of
parental rights, only the Juvenile Court Act and the Parentage Act allow
for the right to court-appointed counsel. 544 The court found that allowing
an indigent parent the right to the assistance of appointed counsel to pro-
tect his parental rights was a "privilege" within the purview of Article I,
Section 21 of the North Dakota Constitution.545 Because this "privilege"
was not equally available to all persons under the Adoption Act, and
because parents have a fundamental right to protect their children, the
court applied strict scrutiny to the Adoption Act.546 The court found that
the Adoption Act did not meet the strict scrutiny test because it did not
include all vho are similarly situated.547 The court concluded that indi-
gent persons were entitled to representation under the Adoption Act, and
that the trial court's discretionary authority under the Adoption Act was
limited to determining whether a party is indigent and unable to afford
counsel.548
The supreme court reversed and remanded, directing that if Tom
could prove his indigence, he was to receive a court-appointed
attorney.
5 49
539. See N.D. CrNT. CODE § 14-17-24 (1991).
540. In re Adoption of KA.S., 499 N.W.2d at 561.
541. Id. at 563.
542. Id.
543. I& See N.D. CONST. art. 1, section 21 (providing that no "citizen or class of citizens [shall]
be granted privileges or immunitites which upon die same terms shall not be granted to all citizens.").
544. it re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 563.
54. Id.
546. Id. at 564.
547. Id at 565.
548. Id. at 564.




Burlington Northern Railroad v. State
In Burlington Northern Railroad v. State,550 the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that corporations are not entitled to the state sales
tax exemption for regularly rented hotel and motel accommodations
unless the same employee or employees occupy the accommodation for
thirty consecutive days or more.s'5
Burlington Northern Railroad and Northwest Airlines were corpora-
tions that regularly rented hotel or motel accommodations for their
employees for periods of thirty days or more. These corporations
claimed a sales tax exemption under section 57-39.2-04(22) of the North
Dakota Century Code, which provides an exemption for "[giross receipts
from the leasing or renting of a hotel or motel room or tourist accommo-
dations occupied by the same person or persons for residential housing for
periods of thirty or more consecutive days."- "Burlington Northern
Railroad and Northwest Airlines sought declaratory and injunctive relief
to prevent the Tax Department from enforcing its interpretation" of the
statute.5
Burlington Northern and Northwest Airlines contended that a corpo-
ration which procured hotel or motel accommodations for thirty or more
consecutive days is subject to the sales tax exemption, regardless of how
long any individual employee occupies the accommodation."55 The Tax
Commission argued that the legislature's intention was that the statute
refer to natural persons, not corporations.556
The district court determined that the statute was unambiguous, bas-
ing its decision on the inclusion of corporations in the statutory definition
of "person" 7 under section 57-39.2-01(5) of the North Dakota Century
Code. 8s  Accordingly, the district court held that the tax exemption
applies to corporations which procure hotel or motel accommodations
for thirty or more consecutive days, regardless of whether the same
employee or employees occupy the premises for that time.5 9 The state
appealed.- °
550. 500 N.W.2d 615 (N.D. 1993).
551. Burlington N. R.R. v. State, 500 N.W.2d 615, 618 (N.D. 1993).
552. Id. at 616.
553. Id
554. Id.
555. Id. at 616-17.
556. Burlington, 500 N.W.2d 617.
557. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-01(5) (providing that "'[pierson' includes any individual,
firm, partnership, joint adventure, association, corporation, estate, business trust, receiver, or any
other goup or combination acting as a unit and the plural as well as the singular number").
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The supreme court, in construing the statute, looked to the princi-
ples of statutory construction. 6 The court stated that the main purpose
of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature's intent.5 62 Legisla-
tive intent must first be sought from the face of the statute.-' When such
intent is facially apparent, the statutory language cannot be disre-
garded.5- However, when the language of the statute is susceptible to
differing rational interpretations, the court may look to extrinsic sources
to determine the legislative intent.56
The court recognized that corporations are included within the defi-
nition of "person" in other state statutes.56 The court also noted, how-
ever, that construing the words in their ordinary sense, "occupy" and
"residential housing" imply inhabitation or possession for nonbusiness
purposes.5 67 Therefore, a corporation could not actually "inhabit" a hotel
or motel accommodation. 8
The legislative history included testimony by the director of the Sales
and Special Taxes Division of the state tax department which requested a
modification of the then-existing statute to include a "same person"
restriction to prevent sales tax avoidance by large transportation compa-
nies.5 69 The statute was subsequently amended to include the requested
"same person" restriction. 570
Based on this extrinsic information, the supreme court determined
that "the legislature intended to restrict the sales tax exemption to situa-
tions in which the same natural person or natural persons occupy an
accommodation for thirty consecutive days or more."571 The court thus
held that corporations that rent rooms for their employees will be subject
to the sales tax unless the same employee or employees occupy the room
for at least thirty days.572
The judgment of the district court was reversed. 73
561. Id at 617-18
562. id at 617.




567. Id. at 618.
568. Burlington, 500 N.W.2d at 618.
569. Id. (quoting testimony on behalf of S.B. 2393 by Walt Stack. Director of the Sales and









In Thompson v. Danner,57e the North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the determination that because a bank's security interest pre-
ceded the formation of a joint venture, crops grown by the joint venture
remained subject to the bank's security interest.575
Mel and Max Danner were children of Jean Thompson. 576 Jean
Thompson was the sole stockholder of Gene Thompson Chip Potato,
Inc.su7 Jean and Gene Thompson were married. 78 The Danners and
Thompsons talked about forming a joint venture in early 1990 for that
year's potato crop. 7 9 The Danners were to furnish 690 acres to the joint
venture.580 The Thompsons were to furnish 160 acres to the joint ven-
ture.581 The Thompsons had rented the 160 acres from the Danners the
previous year.58 2 On April 3, 1990, the First American Bank and Trust
Company of Grafton [hereinafter the Bank] and the Danners executed a
security agreement.Y Pursuant to the security agreement, the Bank
loaned the Danners over $740,000 for current and previous farming
expenses in exchange for a security interest in the 1990 crops which were
to be grown on the proposed joint venture land.58
The Danners and Thompsons started planting their crops three
weeks after the Danners had signed the security agreement with the
Bank.sas The joint venture agreement between the Danners and Thomp-
sons, however, was not signed until late June or early July.586 The joint
venture agreement proposed to split the proceeds from the crops
between the Danners and the Thompsons. 87 The agreement also called
for a "[s]eparate storage deal" for Gene Thompson Chip, Inc., in which it
was to receive 100% of the storage fees.588
After the harvest was complete, the Thompsons learned that the
Bank had received the proceeds from the crops according to the security
agreement signed by the Danners. 8 9 The Thompsons then filed an
574. 507 N.W.2d 550 (N.D. 1993).
575. Thompson v. Danner, 507 N.W.2d 550, 552-53 (N.D. 1993).
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agricultural processor's lien and asserted a first priority lien over the crop
proceeds590 The Danners then brought an action against the Thomp-
sons to have the lien invalidated.5 9' The Thompsons brought a third-
party action against the Bank to have their lien declared superior to the
Bank's security interest.592 The trial court consolidated the actions.593
The trial court determined that the Bank's security interest preceded the
formation of the joint venture. 94 The trial court thus determined that
the crops grown on the joint venture land remained subject to the Bank's
security interest.59 5 Both the Thompsons and the Bank appealed.596
The Thompsons first argued that their interest in the joint venture
was superior to the Bank's security interest in future crops. 97 The North
Dakota Supreme Court analyzed North Dakota's adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code and concluded that crops need not be planted in order
for a creditor to have a valid security interest with respect to those
crops.5 98 The court determined that because the Bank had signed the
security interest with respect to the future crops prior to the formation of
the joint venture, the Bank's security interest was superior to the Thomp-
sons' interest in the joint venture.,5 99
The Thompsons next argued that an interest in a joint venture is not
susceptible to the liabilities of an individual member of the joint venture
and as such, the Bank could not have a valid security interest in the future
crops of the joint venture because the security interest pertained to the
Danners and not to the joint venture.600 The Thompsons relied on the
Uniform Partnership Act's declaration that "[a] partner's right in specific
partnership property is not subject to attachment... except on a claim
against the partnership."60 ' Although the court agreed with the substance
of this provision, it pointed out that joint venture "property remains sub-
ject to liens .. .that existed prior to the transfer of the property to the
[joint venture]." 602 The court thus concluded that the Danners could not
circumvent the rights of their creditors "by contributing the secured prop-
erty to a joint venture."603
590. Thompson, 507 N.W.2d at 553.
591. 1&
592. Id.
593. Id at 554.
594. Id.
595. Thompson, 507 N.W.2d at 554.
596. Id.
597. Id at 555.
598. Id.
599. Id.
600. Thompson, 507 N.W.2d at 556.
601. Id (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. § 45-08-02(1)(2)(c)).




The Thompsons finally argued that because they processed the crop,
they were entitled to a processor's lien.6" Section 35-30-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that any person performing a service on a
crop is entitled to an agricultural processor's lien . ' However, the court
noted that section 35-30-01 of the North Dakota Century Code does not
explicitly state whether the lien applies if the individual performing a ser-
vice on the crop is also the owner of the crop. 6  The court concluded
that the processor's lien was not intended to authorize liens in favor of
persons who process their own cropsY
07
Finally, the Bank argued that it should have been awarded the con-
tract storage payments that were received from the crops of the joint ven-
ture.608 The supreme court disagreed.60 9 The court compared the
contract storage payments to government storage payments and con-
cluded that the payments were received as compensation for services pro-
vided, not as a result of the disposition of the crop.610 The court
determined that the Bank was not entitled to the contract storage pay-
ments since they were not addressed in the security agreement.611
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 1
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, P.C. v. Bolken
In Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson, P.C. v. Bolken,613 the North Dakota
Supreme Court considered a creditor's appeal from a summary judgment
ruling.6 14 Kadrmas, Lee & Jackson (KLJ) argued that partial payments on
an open account should toll (stop and restart) the statute of limitations for
the debt.615 The supreme court agreed and remanded for further
proceedings.6 16
KLJ conducted engineering services for Bolken from 1978 to
1982.17 The bill for the services was nearly $14,000.61' KLJ received a
604. Id. at 558-59 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. § 35-30-01 (Supp. 1993) (providing that any
personperforming a service on a crop is entitled to an agricultural processor's lien)).
605. See N.D. CENT. CODE. § 35-30-01 (Supp. 1993).
606. d
607. Thompson, 507 N.W.2d at 559.




612. Thompson, 507 N.W.2d at 561.
613. 508 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1993).
614. Kadrnias, Lee & Jackson, P.C. v. Bolken, 508 N.W.2d 341, 342-43 (N.D. 1993).
615. Id at 342.
616. Id at 347.
617. Id at 342.
618. Id
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total of $10,000 in four payments from 1984 to 1989.619 In January 1990,
KLJ commenced this action for the remaining principal and interest due
of nearly $13,000.620 Bolken moved for a summary judgment, claiming
that KLJ's action was barred by the statute of limitations.8 2' The trial
court agreed.62'
The supreme court explained that the six-year statute of limitations
period for an action upon contract starts to run after the claim has
become enforceable. 6  In the case of an account stated, in which the
terms to a contract are set, the claim becomes enforceable when the
statement is made.62 In the case of an open account, in which the terms
to a contract are not set, the claim becomes enforceable when each ser-
vice or item is provided.
625
KLJ first asserted that an oral agreement with Bolken was reached in
November,6 2 6 changing the open account to an account stated.627 The
court looked to section 28-01-36 of the North Dakota Century Code and
determined that with a plain language reading of the statute, the agree-
ment should have been in writing to be acceptable. 6 8 The court found
no written agreement. 2 9
KLJ, in the alternative, asserted that the partial payments received
tolled the statute of limitations and requested the court to overrule
Erenfeld v. Erenfeld.6-° The court, in a unanimous decision, quoted the
dissenting opinion of Justice Teigen in Erenfeld, stating that" 'a part pay-
ment of a debt may, under proper circumstances, constitute such an
acknowledgment of a larger debt that will raise an implication of a new
promise to pay the balance and set the statute of limitations running
anew. This is the general, if not the universal, rule.' ,,1 Since the trial
court had not determined whether the partial payments had been made
so as to apply against the entire debt, the case was remanded for further
proceedings. 2
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether to apply the deci-
sion prospectively or retroactively.633 The court stated that the reliance of
619. Kadrmas, 508 N.W.2d at 342.
620. I&
621. Id. at 342-43.
622. Id.
623. Id. at 343.




628. Id. at 344.
629. Kadrmas, 508 N.W.2d at 344.
630. Id. (citing Erenfeld v. Erenfeld, 196 N.W.2d 406 (N.D. 1972)).
631. I1& at 345 (quoting Erenfeld, 196 N.W.2d at 412).
632. Id. at 347.
633. Id. at 346.
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two parties entering a contract is the controlling interest that needs to be
protected, not the paying for services already received. 14 The court
therefore chose to apply its decision overruling Erenfeld retroactively as
well as prospectively.'s
The supreme court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. 6
TORT-DUTY OF ORDINARY CARE
Kukowski v. Simonson Farm, Inc.
In Kukowski v. Simonson Farm, Inc.,63 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that neighboring landowners have a duty to use ordinary care
when attempting to control or remove weeds on their property.38
Land owned by the defendant was placed into the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP)." 9 During the growing season, Russian thistle
and kochia grew on the CRP land.6 ° In late October, and after freeze
up, the defendant combined the kochia and Russian thistle in an attempt
to control the growth of the weeds."4 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's combine broke off the weeds in an unnatural manner,
allowing the weeds to blow onto the plaintiff's property and cause dam-
age."" The plaintiffs claimed damages for the costs of present and future
weed control, cleanup costs, and losses due to reduced yields.
6
4
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment based on the plaintiffs' failure to establish a duty owed to them by
the defendant.6 " The district court based its decision, in part, on the
holding in Langer v. Goode,64 which "reiterated the common law that
there is no duty 'as to adjoining occupiers to cut thistles which are the
natural growth of the soil."',,
The supreme court determined that the Langer ruling was misap-
plied to the facts of this case, because in this case the issue was not
whether the defendant was under a duty to cut the weeds, but rather
whether the defendant, after deciding to cut the weeds, owed his neigh-
634. Kadrmas, 508 N.W.2d at 347.
635. Id
636. 1&
637. 507 N.W.2d 68 (N.D. 1993).





643. Kukowskd, 507 N.W.2d at 69.
644. Id.
645. 131 N.W. 258 (N.D. 1911).
646. Kukowski, 507 N.W.2d at 70, (quoting Langer, 131 N.W. at 260).
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bors a duty of care.647 The court held that "there is a duty to use ordinary
care when attempting to control or remove weeds."648
The court stated, "[O]ur decision does not create a new duty for
farmers to control the spread of weeds. It recognizes farmers must exer-
cise ordinary care when actively working the land. Ordinary care is the
care an ordinary, prudent, and careful person would use in similar
circumstances."649
The court held that the defendants owed a duty of ordinary care in
their weed control effort and that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to breach, causation, and damages.6 0 The decision of the district court
was reversed and remanded." 1
VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Farm Credit Services of Mandan, FLCA, v. Crow
In Farm Credit Services of Mandan, FLCA, v. Crow,"2 Farm Credit
brought a foreclosure of mortgage action against the mortgage holder,
Beulah Jorgensen.Y-
In 1985, Jorgensen agreed to sell ranch-land valued at $150,000 to
her nephew, Leslie Crow, and his wife, Donna.6  The purchase price
was to be paid with an $85,000 cash payment financed by the Federal
Land Bank of Dickinson and a contract for deed from Jorgensen for
$65,000.6 The Crows signed a promissory note for the amount of the
loan. 8 Both the Crows and Jorgensen executed a mortgage on the land
as security for the loan. 5 7 Farm Credit later acquired this interest.6"8
The Crows were required to make annual payments to Jorgensen to apply
against the principal and interest of the contract for deed.659 Jorgensen
then rented the land in return for the annual payments.660 After the clos-
ing, the Crows unintentionally acquired a warranty deed which they sub-
sequently recorded.66'
647. Kukowski, 507 N.W.2d at 70.
648. Id.
649. Id.
650. Id. at 71.
651. Id.
652. 501 N.W.2d 756 (N.D. 1993).











In 1986 and 1987, Jorgensen did not make the Crow's annual pay-
ment under the contract for deed even though she rented the land from
the Crows during those years. 62 The Crows subsequently attempted to
remove the cattle, claiming that they were record owners of the land.6
Jorgensen then brought suit against the Crows, seeking to set aside the
recorded warranty deed.6' The subsequent litigation canceled the con-
tract for deed between the Crows and Jorgensen as the Crows had
defaulted on their obligation to make payments under the contract for
deed.66 ' Farm Credit brought the mortgage foreclosure action against
the Crows and Jorgensen because the Crows had defaulted on the prom-
issory note. 6 Jorgensen answered the complaint, asserting that she had
not signed the promissory note and that she was not responsible for the
Crow's debt.6 7 Jorgensen later moved to amend her answer to allege
that she was a surety and that she had a right to recover any losses she
sustained in settling the Crow's debt.
665
The district court determined that Farm Credit was not seeking a
monetary ruling against Jorgensen and she had not raised any material
facts to support her surety claim.669 The district court granted summary
judgment for Farm Credit to foreclose on the mortgage.670
On appeal, Jorgensen argued that the district court erred by deter-
mining that she was not a surety.67 ' A surety is an individual that pledges
property for the debt of another.67 2 The court determined that Jorgen-
sen, by canceling the contract for deed with the Crows, discontinued the
role of surety and assumed the role of sole mortgagor.6 7 3 The court also
determined that since cross-claims are permissive against co-parties, Jor-
gensen was free to bring her claims against the Crows in a different
action.674
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the district court.6
662. Id.





668. Farm Credit Seros., 501 N.W.2d at 757.
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